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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL WHAT?  
TOWARD A UNIFIED DEFINITION OF 
PUNISHMENT 
RAFF DONELSON∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues for an expanded understanding of legal punishment 
for American courts to use. Punishment, on this new view, includes all 
significant harm caused by state actors’ retributive intent and most 
significant harm that befalls someone as a result of the state seeking 
retribution against her. What commends this new definition is not that it 
tracks lexicographers’ or metaphysicians’ understandings of punishment; 
rather, this new definition aims to track relevant moral and political 
considerations. Importantly, the proposed definition results from an 
attempt to reason from the perspective of someone harmed by state 
practices, as that perspective has greater moral import than perspectives 
of courts, lawmakers, or corrections officials. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
cruel and unusual punishment.1 To interpret this prohibition, one needs 
first to construe punishment, and only after that, can one determine 
whether something, which already counts as punishment, is so cruel and 
unusual that the Constitution forbids it. So it would seem. Reasonable as 
this strategy sounds, the United States Supreme Court has declined to 
employ it. Instead, the Court has largely tried to sidestep the question of 
what should count as punishment, or the punishment question. 
In sidestepping the punishment question for the Eighth Amendment, 
the Court has tried to directly address the question of what counts as cruel 
and unusual punishment. As a result, the Court, at best, ‘tips its hand’ 
about an answer to the punishment question. When the Court holds that 
some happening qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment, that 
happening, a fortiori, is punishment.2 Alternatively, on occasion, one may 
surmise that a happening that is held not to violate the Eighth Amendment 
is constitutionally valid because it is not punishment at all.3 Neither 
inferences from constitutional violations nor surmising from non-
violations yields a general answer to the punishment question. In the 
absence of an answer to this question, we face legal confusion, problems 
for the rule of law, and a greater chance of injustice. Though some 
scholars laud sidestepping strategies of this kind,4 the aforementioned 
harms vastly outweigh the benefits. 
The Court’s sidestepping strategy raises problems not only in the 
Eighth Amendment context, but also elsewhere. The punishment question 
must be answered in order to interpret several other constitutional 
provisions. The word “punishment” and its cognates only occur seven 
times5 in the Constitution6 and mostly in minor clauses; however, the 
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 2. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37 (1993) (holding that exposure to secondhand 
smoke may count as cruel and unusual punishment for prisoners required to share a cell with a 
smoker). 
 3. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (“the Eighth Amendment does not 
apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools” because its 
function is to limit “the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.”) 
 4. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999).  
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6; U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII, § 1. 
 6. U.S. CONST. For comparison, “Congress” occurs over sixty times, “court” occurs ten times, 
“freedom” just once. 
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concept of punishment is implicated in numerous, weighty constitutional 
provisions. The Ex Post Facto Clauses deny Congress7 and the states8 
power to punish for actions that were not criminal at the time of action.9 
This obviously implicates the question of what counts as punishment.10 
The Double Jeopardy Clause,11 inter alia, prevents multiple punishments 
for the same offense.12 The Fifth Amendment announces more procedural 
protections for defendants in criminal cases, such as the right against self-
incrimination,13 the right to indictment by grand jury,14 and the 
requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.15 These 
protections also implicate the notion of punishment because arguably one 
distinguishes between civil and criminal cases, in part, by claiming that the 
latter always features punishment.16 The procedural protections of the 
Sixth Amendment, which include the Speedy Trial Clause,17 the 
Confrontation Clause,18 the guarantee of trial by impartial jury,19 and the 
right to counsel even when one cannot afford it,20 implicate the notion of 
punishment for the very same reason. 
This spate of provisions amply demonstrates that the Constitution 
requires courts to develop an answer to the punishment question. With 
 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 9. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The prohibition 
considered in this light, is an additional bulwark in favour of the personal security of the subject, to 
protect his person from punishment by legislative acts, having a retrospective operation. I do not think 
it was inserted to secure the citizen in his private rights, of either property, or contracts.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 10. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (“The ex post facto prohibition forbids the 
Congress and the States to enact any law which imposes a punishment for an act ‘which was not 
punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’”) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325–26). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 12. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 106 (2003) (“Under this Clause, once a defendant 
is placed in jeopardy for an offense, and jeopardy terminates with respect to that offense, the defendant 
may neither be tried nor punished a second time for the same offense.”). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 14. Id. 
 15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“the Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime with which he is charged.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-
Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 781–82 (1997); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-
Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 685–86 (1999) (explaining that American criminal law 
paradigmatically punishes). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
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these provisions in mind, the Court has offered some guidance in 
answering the punishment question,21 but as we will see below, the Court 
has still failed to provide a workable answer.22 Given the need to answer 
the punishment question and the problems with the Court’s current 
strategies of addressing the question, we need to develop a working 
definition of punishment. 
The goal of this Article is to develop such a definition. The layout of 
the Article is as follows. Part I explains what an answer to the punishment 
question would look like and why we need one. Part II examines the 
Court’s sidestepping strategy in the Eighth Amendment context. Part III 
looks at the Court’s attempt to define punishment in a criminal-civil 
distinction case and shows why this yields unsatisfactory answers to the 
punishment question. Part IV looks beyond the courts to appraise a 
definition of punishment offered by a legal commentator. This definition, 
though a step in the right direction, is both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive. Part V offers a new definition, which improves upon the 
mistakes highlighted in Part IV. Finally, Part VI concludes the article with 
a brief summary and defense of the argumentative strategy. 
I. THE NEED FOR A DEFINITION 
In order to make a persuasive case that the Court should adopt my 
particular definition of punishment, we must first see why the Court needs 
any definition of punishment and, indeed, what a definition of punishment 
is and how one should evaluate different definitions of punishment. 
I proceed by first clarifying what a definition of punishment must have 
in order to count as a definition at all. Next, I explain the standard by 
which to judge definitions of punishment. After that, I offer some reasons 
why a court might want to adopt a general definition instead of proceeding 
case-by-case, tipping its hand in the direction of an answer. With those 
reasons in mind, I then argue that the benefits of providing a general 
answer to the punishment question far outweighs the costs identified by 
judicial minimalists like Cass Sunstein. 
A. What is a Definition of Punishment? 
Time and again, commentators from within and without the courts have 
noted that the United States Supreme Court has failed to offer a general 
 
 
 21. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 22. See infra Part II.A.  
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definition of cruel and unusual punishment. This criticism is all the more 
apt when one notes that the Court has not only failed to state the necessary 
and sufficient conditions under which a punishment becomes cruel and 
unusual but also that the Court has said almost nothing in the Eighth 
Amendment context about the conditions that must be met for something 
to count as punishment at all. To appreciate this failure, we must first see 
what offering a definition requires. 
To define punishment (or anything), one must go beyond giving 
examples.23 To note, as many courts have in passing, that incarceration, 
denationalization, disqualification from public office, hanging, solitary 
confinement, and hard labor are instances of punishment, is not to define 
it. Giving examples merely suggests sufficient conditions for punishment.  
Also, to define punishment or anything, one must go beyond 
mentioning features that all punishments have in common. To note, as 
many courts have, that all punishment is painful or that all punishment is 
only rightly bestowed on those duly convicted of an offense, is also not to 
define it. These claims about what all punishments share may very well be 
correct, but they merely state necessary conditions for something to count 
as punishment. Offering necessary conditions alone does not define 
punishment because other things may have the same features. For 
instance, it might be true that all punishments are painful, but losing a 
presidential election is also painful, as are losing a friend to illness and 
losing a lawsuit. As none of these latter pains are rightly called 
punishment, at least not ordinarily, the necessary condition “is painful” 
does not yet define punishment. 
To offer a proper definition requires a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Such a set would name not only what all punishments have in 
common but also what is unique to punishment. Against this standard of 
defining a concept, we will later judge the long and sordid history of the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
B. Defining, not Discovering, Punishment 
Having settled what a definition must include—a set of conditions that 
all and only punishments share—we must now figure out how to judge 
various candidate definitions. We should judge any effort to define 
punishment by its likelihood to help us achieve the practical ends set by 
the Eighth Amendment and the other clauses of the Constitution that 
 
 
 23. See, e.g., PLATO, Euthyphro, in PLATO: COLLECTED DIALOGUES 169–85 (Edith Hamilton & 
Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper trans. Princeton Univ. Press 1941) (c. 400 B.C.E.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss1/5
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invoke the notion of punishment. That is to say, the definition must track 
that thing which we should forbid lawmakers to impose without prior 
notice (via the Ex Post Facto Clauses),24 which is the same thing which we 
should prohibit the state from imposing on someone without proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that she was legally culpable (via the Due 
Process Clauses),25 which is the same thing that we say ought not be 
excessive or cruel (via the Cruel and Unusual Clause).26 If a purportedly 
good definition fails on any of these measures, that definition is wrong. 
One might call this method of evaluating answers to the punishment 
question, a pragmatist method, for it focuses our attention on practical 
matters, such as what we should forbid or allow, as opposed to 
metaphysical matters, like the true nature of punishment or what 
determines the content of our concepts. This pragmatist method foils the 
view of those who think our definition should approximate or represent 
some transcendent sense of punishment, which was always there waiting 
to be discovered.27 Call that latter approach a representationalist approach. 
Space does not allow for any full-scale argument for the pragmatist 
approach and against the representationalist approach, for that project 
deserves its own article- or book-length treatment. Instead, one might note 
two things. First, celebrated philosophers have long held that 
representationalist attempts to answer Platonic “What is x?” questions are 
all bound to fail.28 If one accepts those influential arguments, the 
pragmatist approach should look enticing. Second, more recent theorists 
have held that, even if it were possible to answer “What is x?” questions in 
the representationalist way, we ought not to attempt that when we are 
tasked with trying to define moral or political terms.29 These recent 
theorists claim that defining moral and political terms is a task that, by its 
 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 27. That type of idea lies behind Justice Scalia’s claim that “An intent requirement is either 
implicit in the word ‘punishment’ or is not; it cannot be alternately required and ignored as policy 
considerations might dictate.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1991). For reasons I make clear 
later in the text of this Article, he is precisely wrong. Policy considerations do dictate how to construe 
punishment, since our task is construing terms in order to have effective, just government, not 
construing terms to publish a lexicon. 
 28. See, W. V. O Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 THE PHIL. REV. 20, 20–43 (1951) 
(arguing that representationalist analysis relies on a unspecifiable type of synonymy); LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 65-67 (1953) (arguing that we cannot offer 
necessary and sufficient conditions for terms in the representationalist way; we can only talk about 
family resemblances). 
 29. See CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 114 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); 
Liam Murphy, Concepts of Law, 30 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2005). 
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very nature, calls on us to think about our practical ends, and thus, we 
should evaluate our definitions in light of those ends. These two sets of 
concerns—skepticism on the one hand and embracing the practical turn on 
the other—lead one to adopt a pragmatist way of deciding which 
definition of punishment to accept. 
C. What is a Definition Good For? 
One might agree with my account of what a definition of punishment 
requires and agree with a pragmatist account of how to choose the right 
definition while remaining dubious about whether the Court should offer 
any definition of punishment in the first place. Below, I consider and 
reject a key reason to object to my suggestion, but before that, I make the 
positive case for courts to define punishment.  
The Court should adopt a definition of punishment because failing to 
do so creates three big problems. Without a definition of punishment, 
lower courts face increased legal confusion, all those subject to a legal 
regime confront rule of law issues, and some potential plaintiffs suffer 
injustice. 
The possibility of legal confusion requires little elaboration. Obviously, 
when the Court fails to provide a general answer to the punishment 
question, it leaves open questions that lower courts must answer on their 
own. This inevitably leads to disagreement among different jurisdictions 
and confusion until the Court decides to rule on the issue. 
More troubling than legal confusion are the rule of law problems that 
attend the Court’s failure to answer the punishment question. For the rule 
of law to be respected in a polity, the laws that govern subjects ought to be 
prospective, clear, coherent, and promulgated (as opposed to secret).30 
Arguably, the degree to which the Constitution embodies the rule of law 
diminishes without a clear answer to the punishment question. Subjects 
should know, in advance of a lawsuit, what counts as punishment, so they 
can know what cannot happen to them before they receive due process or 
which happenings ought to be tested to see if they are too cruel and 
unusual to be imposed. Knowing this information in advance of a case 
allows persons to plan their lives, to be ruled by law and not the whims of 
others. This is the value of prospectivity. Those subject to a legal regime 
should also be able to understand the connection between one ruling on an 
issue related to the punishment question and another such ruling. 
 
 
 30. This list of factors is taken from JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270–73 
(1980). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss1/5
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Otherwise, the law lacks clarity and coherence. Without clarity and 
coherence, the law is not predictable, and subjects are ruled by what 
appear to be personal whims and not law. Finally, if there is some 
underlying, unified understanding of punishment that informs various 
norms that will ultimately govern subjects of a legal regime, those should 
be publicly announced, not hidden until some later time. That is to say, 
when law is not promulgated, subjects of a legal regime are not governed 
by law, but by whims. 
Most troubling of all is the injustice that potential plaintiffs face when 
the Court refuses to offer a general definition of punishment. Convicted 
felons, for instance, regularly face many harms during and after a period 
of incarceration.31 It is not totally clear which of these count as punishment 
in the absence of an answer to the punishment question. Second-hand 
smoke from other inmates always counts,32 sexual assault from other 
inmates sometimes counts,33 loss of voting rights as a result of conviction 
never counts.34 When there is a case of first impression, felons are in a 
difficult position. Without a general definition of punishment to guide 
them, they do not know when to seek legal redress. If the felons decide to 
try to seek redress anytime they suspect that their constitutional rights 
were violated, which seems like the dominant strategy, they may be unable 
to find professional help. Very many plaintiffs’ attorneys operate on a 
contingency fee basis35 and may be unwilling to take the financial risk of 
suing the government with a novel theory. This means that potentially 
successful suits may not be litigated. That, in turn, means that legal 
wrongs will not be redressed, all because the Court will not adopt a 
general definition of punishment. 
To recap, answering the punishment question is valuable because it 
will lessen legal confusion, respect the rule of law, and prevent a certain 
class of injustices from happening.  
 
 
 31. Joshua Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: How to Add Legitimacy, Purpose, and 
Transparency to ‘Collateral’ Punishment Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 130–44 (2016); 
Joshua Kaiser, We Know It When We See It: The Increasingly Tenuous Line between “Direct 
Punishment” and “Collateral Consequences”, 59 HOW. L.J. 341, 342 (2016). 
 32. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 
 33. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–38 (1994). 
 34. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). 
 35. Adam Shajnfeld, A Critical Survey of the Law, Ethics, and Economics of Attorney Contingent 
Fee Arrangements, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2010) (“Contingent compensation arrangements 
for legal representation are . . . ubiquitous”). 
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D. Against Judicial Minimalism 
Despite these benefits, some would oppose my suggestion that the 
Court answer the punishment question, on the grounds that the Court 
should avoid broad, theoretically ambitious decisions, especially on 
factually or ethically complex matters. This view is typically called 
judicial minimalism. Since Professor Cass Sunstein is one of the most 
ardent supporters of judicial minimalism, I focus on his arguments in favor 
of the view. After looking at Sunstein’s case for judicial minimalism, I 
explain why we should still hope for an answer to the punishment 
question. 
Judicial minimalism, on Sunstein’s version of it, has two dimensions. 
The minimalist is against wide and deep judicial decisions. A decision is 
wide when it announces a rule statement that covers many issues, perhaps 
even ‘beyond’ those raised in the case at hand; it is narrow if the rule 
statement only decides a smaller universe of issues or perhaps just the 
case-at-hand. For instance, suppose in a case before a court, a prisoner 
sues under the Eighth Amendment, alleging that she was sexually 
assaulted by a corrections official. While a narrow decision might hold 
that the sexual assault violated the Eighth Amendment, a wide decision 
might hold that any unwelcome sexual behavior that a corrections officer 
displays toward a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment. In a deep 
decision, the court offers reasons to support its rule statement that abstract 
away from the particulars of the case and focus on more general matters; a 
shallow decision features very particular, local reasons or perhaps even no 
reasons at all. For instance, suppose again we have the prisoner who has 
suffered sexual assault, and further suppose that the court has the narrow 
holding. While a shallow decision might justify the holding by talking 
about the details of the encounter and analogizing it to other decisions, a 
deep decision might justify the holding by talk of what cruelty is, why 
prohibiting its use in punishment promotes ideals to which the nation has 
long been committed, and why sexual assault of prisoners flouts these 
ideals. The judicial minimalist prefers decisions that focus squarely on the 
particulars of the case and that avoid these more sweeping justifications of 
judicial action. 
If the Court were to offer a general answer to the punishment question, 
its decision would be deep and also wide. A decision with an answer to the 
punishment question contained therein will certainly be deep. Any case 
where punishment is implicated only requires the Court to say that that 
happening is punishment or is not; it is a further step down the road 
toward depth to explain why that happening is punishment or is not; and it 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss1/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL WHAT? 11 
 
 
 
 
is a still further step to explain why any happening is punishment. It is this 
‘still further’ step that is answering the punishment question. Also, a 
decision with an answer to the punishment question is likely to be wide. 
Any case where punishment is implicated only requires the Court to say 
what should happen in the case at hand. If, however, the Court ventures an 
answer to the punishment question, it suggests a way to handle lots of 
other cases. 
Having explained judicial minimalism and explained why my 
suggestion conflicts with the call of judicial minimalists, we now turn to 
explaining why Sunstein supports judicial minimalism. His book One 
Case at a Time contains four key reasons to support judicial minimalism: 
(1) judicial minimalism reduces the judicial workload and intellectual 
burden of judges, (2) judicial minimalism will produce fewer wrong 
decisions, (3) judicial minimalism promotes deliberative democracy, and 
(4) judicial minimalism properly respects reasonable pluralism. 
1. Workload 
Judicial minimalism recommends a course of action that is easier than 
answering the punishment question in terms of the workload for judges. 
Coming up with a general theory of punishment is intellectually taxing, 
and forging agreement on a multi-member court is probably even more 
taxing.36 However, this consideration should not carry much weight. 
Consider another judicial strategy to see why. 
Whenever lower courts hear constitutional challenges, they could just 
invariably rule in favor of the government, and when the Supreme Court 
gets petitions for certiorari, it could roundly reject all of them. Call this the 
bizarre strategy. The bizarre strategy would vastly reduce the judicial 
workload. Because it is also wildly unjust, the bizarre strategy is a non-
starter. Reflecting on this strategy shows that even a massive potential to 
reduce judicial workload has less normative weight than the potential for 
injustice. Any more just strategy obviously trumps the bizarre strategy, 
and this seems right even when we recall that, in most constitutional 
challenges, plaintiffs do not prevail anyway.37 In other words, the 
outcomes of a just judicial strategy and the bizarre strategy would largely 
 
 
 36. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 4. 
 37. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CAL. L. REV. 915, 
940 (2011) (showing that both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges generally fail in Supreme 
Court litigation, though success is not rare, as many legal commentators assume). One cannot 
generalize these results to all constitutional challenges, such as those in lower courts; thus, it is 
consistent with Fallon’s findings that constitutional challenges only rarely succeed. 
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coincide, with relatively few substantive injustices. Still, the fact of great 
procedural injustice is more than enough to remove the bizarre strategy 
from consideration. The preceding argument should lead one to think that, 
if strategies that reduce the judicial workload are to be preferred, this is 
only when the more work-intensive strategy features no great advantage in 
terms of justice. 
If we accept that thought, then the judicial minimalist actually faces a 
problem. In the absence of an answer to the punishment question, we do 
get injustice, injustice for some plaintiffs and rule of law problems for all, 
which is its own version of injustice. Neither of these should be borne 
merely to save time and sweat. 
2. Better Decisions 
The second reason to support judicial minimalism, according to 
Sunstein, is the thought this strategy will yield better decisions than a 
suggestion like my own, which calls for a decision of width and depth. 
Sunstein list four reasons why we are likely to get better decisions: 
(1) judges, like all of us, are sometimes in a better position to know 
that something is right than why something is right,38 (2) judges are 
ill-equipped to evaluate philosophical/theoretical arguments,39 
(3) circumstances may change in unforeseen ways,40 and (4) judges, 
like all of us, have bounded rationality.41 
Despite these important considerations, we should be unconvinced that 
judicial minimalism leads to better decisions. One can agree, for instance, 
that sometimes people are better at seeing that something is right than 
seeing why it is right, and one can further agree that when folks start 
pontificating about why something is right when they are only apprised of 
the fact of its rightness, they are likely to err. Nevertheless, it is a 
commonplace that people sometimes understand general principles and are 
bad at applying them. When that human tendency is in play, minimalism 
looks like a mistake because a minimalist decision could reach the wrong 
outcome and fail to include the broad general statements that would be 
correct. 
 
 
 38. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 15. 
 39. Id. at 247. 
 40. Id. at 48. 
 41. Id. at 52 (1999). 
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Also, while circumstances may change in unforeseen ways, but it is not 
clear why such changes would tend to invalidate broad rulings instead of 
tending to vindicate broad rulings. Even if changing circumstances did 
show broad rulings to be often wrong, that provides no reason for courts to 
decide cases as narrowly and shallowly as possible. That offends the rule 
of law. Instead, courts should admit their fallibility and be ready to change 
course, if they find they have erred. Much the same applies to thinking of 
judges’ bounded rationality. 
Finally, one might resist Sunstein’s skepticism about judges’ 
intellectual capacities, especially with respect to federal appellate court 
judges. Since the question is empirical, not much can be said without 
recourse to empirical data. From the armchair, though, it might be 
wondered why, on Sunstein’s picture, law professors become so adept 
with theoretical discussion while federal appellate judges, some of whom 
are drawn from the professoriate, most of whom are drawn from the same 
elite law schools as the professoriate, remain so comparatively dense. 
3. Deliberative Democracy 
A third reason to endorse judicial minimalism is the fact it accords with 
a vision of America as a deliberative democracy.42 By this, Sunstein means 
two things. First, guided by judicial minimalism, judges will permit and 
promote more discussion about the deep issues raised by their cases than 
they would if they merely decided the deep issues on their own. More 
discussion is a good thing in a deliberative democracy because this form 
of democracy urges broad-based participation from citizens and for policy 
outcomes to result from reasoned debate. Second, guided by judicial 
minimalism, judges will allow the elected branches of government to settle 
the deep questions that arise in their cases. This is admirably democratic 
for it allows the reasoned debates from civil society, not debates within 
judges’ chambers, to determine important, deep issues. 
It is hard to argue with deliberative democracy as an ideal. What I can 
do instead is offer an obvious fact and see what follows. The United States 
Constitution, which contemplates an unelected supreme court43 with 
judicial review,44 obviously does not see deliberative democracy as the 
sine qua non of the constitutional order it creates. Some matters are 
supposed to be insulated from the majority will, even if the majority will 
 
 
 42. Id. at 4–5. 
 43. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
 44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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has been shaped only by reasoned debate in the public sphere with 
everyone participating on equal footing, as some versions of deliberative 
democracy demand. For instance, the President cannot be recalled just 
because we lose faith in her abilities, Congress cannot select the Cabinet 
members, and federal judges cannot be popularly elected. All of these 
would allow for more democracy, but that is not the world the Constitution 
envisions. Deliberative democracy, at best, is one virtue among many that 
our constitutional order should try to embody to some extent. Knowing the 
whole story about the standards that govern us before we face their 
consequences—that is another virtue, a rule of law virtue. Arguably, this is 
a more important virtue for our order to embody, in part, because it is 
nowhere contravened in the Constitution. If forced to choose between 
deliberative democracy and the rule of law, that is, forced to choose 
between shirking and answering the punishment question, courts should 
promote the rule of law and answer the punishment question. 
The preceding has presupposed that judicial minimalism actually 
promotes deliberative democracy in the first place, but this is debatable. A 
minimalist (or piecemeal) approach to deciding cases that implicate the 
punishment question will suggest partial answers to the question over 
time. In obeying minimalism, courts will, thereby, remove various issues 
from public debate and will check any intervention from the elected 
branches, short of constitutional amendment. The only way to prevent this 
would be having judgments without decisions and eliminating stare 
decisis. 
Thus, the full response to the judicial minimalist is that (1) enthusiasm 
for deliberative democracy weakly supports judicial minimalism, (2) even 
if deliberative democracy strongly supported judicial minimalism, the 
Constitution weakly supports deliberative democracy. 
4. Reasonable Pluralism  
The final reason Sunstein marshals is the fact that judicial minimalism 
allows us to respect reasonable pluralism.45 Reasonable pluralism is the 
idea that, even if there is a single right answer to certain moral and 
political questions, we can expect reasonable people, who are free to think 
for themselves, to arrive at different answers to those questions. To respect 
reasonable pluralism, say Sunstein and other political liberals like John 
Rawls46 and Martha Nussbaum,47 our political order should not rely on 
 
 
 45. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 41. 
 46. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 139–40 (1996). 
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what it deems to be the correct answer to these controversial questions. To 
do so would disrespect the persons who reasonably disagree with the 
putative right answers.48 Judicial minimalism allows judges to recognize 
and respect reasonable pluralism, because the rulings that courts would 
render would be shallow and thus would avoid discussing the 
controversial matters that would occasion disrespect. 
Pace Sunstein, Rawls, and Nussbaum, I do not see why it is, in any 
way, disrespectful to rely on controversial premises about which people 
reasonably disagree when deciding issues of policy. Seeing no disrespect 
at all, it is hard for me to assuage the worries of those that do. I can only 
offer as support for my side the fact that the government makes decisions 
of this kind in other circumstances where few think that disrespect has 
occurred. When the government houses a piece of art in its national 
galleries or awards someone an National Endowment for the Arts grant, it 
essentially claims that certain pieces of art have great aesthetic merit or 
that certain people have great artistic talent. This is a matter about which 
people reasonably disagree. Still, no one is disrespected by these practices. 
Though I may find Barbra Streisand’s music to be intolerable schmaltz, 
when she received the National Medal of Arts,49 I was not, in any way, 
wronged or disrespected. 
Even if deep decisions are not necessarily disrespectful and thus to be 
rejected on that ground, Sunstein is right that avoiding contentious issues 
may be useful in our pluralistic society. As Sunstein notes, it is a good 
thing “to make it possible for people to agree when agreement is 
necessary, and to make it unnecessary for people to agree when agreement 
is impossible.”50 All the same, when thinking about this good in relation to 
answering the punishment question, two things must be noted. First, it is 
doubtful that agreement on a definition of punishment is impossible. 
Second, however good it might to be to forge easy agreements instead of 
 
 
 47. Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 3, 20. 
 48. Rawls sometimes speaks of the need to respond in his way to reasonable pluralism as a 
necessary strategy for maintaining the stability of a society. RAWLS, supra note 46, at xvii–xix. The 
heart of his view, though, concerns equal respect for persons. The argument upon which he relies is a 
modified version of the Original Position. Id. at 137 n.5. While I would not go as far as to suggest the 
Original Position has nothing to do with stability of a society, I will say that arguments that employ it 
are supposed to show why some arrangement does or does not yield “a fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal citizens.” Id. at 22. That seems to suggest that Rawls is deeply enough 
concerned about properly respecting people when he demands that we respond to reasonable pluralism 
in the politically liberal way. 
 49. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts (Jan. 18, 2016, 6:40 AM), https://www.arts.gov/honors/ 
medals/year/2000. 
 50. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 14. 
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trying to settle disagreements, that good must be weighed against the 
problems that result from failing to answer the punishment question. That 
good, like the workload reduction good, pales in comparison to the 
problems generated by shirking the punishment question. 
II. THE COURT DOES NOT DEFINE PUNISHMENT IN THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT CONTEXT 
In the previous part, we saw why we need to answer the punishment 
question. Here, I review how the United States Supreme Court has tried to 
sidestep the question in the Eighth Amendment context. In many of its 
Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has tried to construe cruel 
punishments as a single concept. In describing that strategy, I also 
highlight its shortcomings. 
A. Early Cases 
One of the earliest Eighth Amendment cases was Pervear v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,51 decided in 1866, where the Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to actions undertaken by state 
governments. The Pervear Court noted, however, in dicta, that the 
treatment of which Pervear complained, a sentence of three months of hard 
labor and a fifty-dollar fine, was not “excessive, or cruel, or unusual.”52 
Here, we have an early instance of the Court suggesting, in passing, that 
some treatment is sufficient for punishment but refusing to mention in 
addition what is necessary for some treatment to count as punishment. 
Thus, one learns, through this case, that hard labor is punishment, just not 
cruel punishment. From this case alone, one cannot be entirely sure 
whether the fine that Pervear received is to be counted as punishment,53 for 
the comment that the treatment was not “excessive” no doubt refers to the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “excessive fines.”54 
In Wilkerson v. State of Utah, decided in 1878, the Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit death by firing squad.55 Later, in 
1890, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit death 
 
 
 51. 72 U.S. 475 (1866). 
 52. Id. at 480. 
 53. It would later be clarified that, strictly speaking, fines are not punishment. There is 
completely separate excessive fines jurisprudence. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 
558 (1993). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 55. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
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by the electric chair in In Re Kemmler.56 In neither of these nineteenth 
century cases does the punishment question arise, but in each, we get 
partial answers. Death by firing squad and death by electric chair are 
punishments that are cognizable under the Eighth Amendment, yet, these 
are not cruel punishments and thus pass constitutional muster. 
Weems v. U.S. is a notable case in that it is among the first to suggest 
that disproportionate punishments violate the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishments.57 Weems, decided in 1910, held that “fifteen years of 
cadena”58 violates the Eighth Amendment when it is imposed for a simple 
act of fraud that does not even benefit the defrauder.59 Cadena, Spanish for 
chain, was a requirement that one remain in iron chains while performing 
“hard and painful labor.”60 While Weems revolutionized contemporary 
juridical understandings of what counts as cruel, it did far less on the 
punishment question front. Obviously, requiring someone to perform hard 
labor under the weight of iron chains, after convicting her of fraud, is to 
punish that person. So obvious is this point, the question of what counts as 
punishment never even arises in the Weems case. 
At this point in recounting the history of the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment decisions, one might be tempted to think that all of them 
really should go the way of Weems and its forebears. That is to say, it may 
come as little surprise that the punishment question is neither raised nor 
explicitly answered in Eighth Amendment litigation. In many Eighth 
Amendment cases, the question is not whether the treatment is punishment 
but whether its severity is of such a degree (proportionally or absolutely) 
that the Constitution forbids it. 
 
 
 
 56. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). This case is interesting in that it is not technically decided under the 
Eighth Amendment. The Court is still operating under the theory that the Eighth Amendment applies 
only to the national government and is not incorporated anywhere to apply to the states. However, 
Kemmler is an early example of looking at the Fourteenth Amendment, in both the Due Process Clause 
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as possible constitutional basis for overturning treatment that 
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. 
 57. This case vindicates the view held by Justice Field when he dissented in O’Neil v. State of 
Vermont. O’Neil was sentenced to over 54 years of prison for selling liquor without a license. The 
Court did not reach the question of whether his outrageously severe sentence was too cruel to be 
constitutionally permissible, because the Court held that the sentence, bestowed by Vermont law, was 
beyond the reach of the Eighth Amendment. Field vehemently disagreed with this and further thought 
that the severe sentence was much more severe than the constitution permits for such offenses. O’Neil 
v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 58. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 358 (1910). 
 59. Id. at 382. 
 60. Id. at 364. 
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B. Turning Points 
Things begin to change in Trop v. Dulles.61 For this 1958 case, the 
issue was whether divesting an Army private of his American citizenship 
for desertion comported with the Eighth Amendment. The Court 
considered first whether the denationalization was punishment and then, 
after concluding that it was,62 held that the punishment was cruel and 
unusual.63 Because the punishment question was explicitly raised, the 
Court devoted some time to offering a definition of punishment. Chief 
Justice Warren, writing for the Court,64 reasoned, “If the statute imposes a 
disability for the purposes of punishment—that is, to reprimand the 
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been considered penal.”65 In other 
words, if the law imposes a disability and does so for specific reasons, 
namely reprimanding reasons (henceforth retributive reasons), deterrent 
reasons, and some unspecified other reasons that are traditionally 
associated with punishment, then the law imposes a punishment. 
To his credit, Chief Justice Warren offered a definition that appears to 
offer necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as 
punishment. The necessary conditions are the disability and the reasons for 
imposing the disability, and, insofar as this purports to be a definition, the 
further claim must be that these are jointly sufficient for punishment. 
Despite its merits, there are two formal problems with this definition. 
First, the definition suffers from a circularity problem. The definiendum is 
in the definiens! We have to know what punishment is to be able to know 
about this third class of reasons to which Warren alludes. Of course, if we 
already know what punishment is, we do not need anyone’s definition. 
The second formal problem is that the definition contains a certain 
ambiguity. Attention to the specific language bears this out. Warren writes 
that the disability must be imposed “for the purposes of punishment.”66 
Does this mean that the disability has to be imposed for retributive reasons 
AND deterrent reasons AND the unspecified set of reasons? Surely, it 
would be more plausible to suggest that any one of the three reasons 
would suffice. Though it would be more plausible, this suggestion creates 
 
 
 61. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 62. Id. at 97. 
 63. Id. at 101. 
 64. Warren’s opinion is for a plurality of the Court. His judgment, that denationalization is 
punishment and that this instance of punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, is the judgment of 
the Court. 
 65. Trop, 356 U.S. at 96. 
 66. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
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substantive problems for the definition. Instead of exploring those now, let 
us continue examining the history of Eighth Amendment cases, for these 
make enough trouble for Warren’s definition. 
Consider two cases from the 1970s, Ingraham v. Wright67 and Estelle v. 
Gamble.68 In Ingraham, schoolchildren sued their school for paddling 
them with such severity that it sometimes required medical attention.69 In 
Gamble, a prisoner sued prison officials and his doctors, alleging they did 
not adequately address injuries that resulted when a 600-pound bale of 
cotton fell on him.70 Both plaintiffs claimed that their respective 
treatments amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Before explaining 
what the Court decided in each case, let us see how Warren’s definition 
fares. Recall that according to that definition, punishment obtains when 
there is a disability, imposed for retributive, deterrent and/or71 other 
punishment-related reasons. Seemingly, we have punishment in Ingraham 
but none in Gamble. We have punishment in Ingraham because the 
paddling by school officials certainly imposes a disability, and it is 
plausible to assume that they had the requisite kinds of reasons in mind. In 
Gamble, by contrast, the disabilities, injuries from the cotton accident, 
were not imposed by anyone; thus, a fortiori, they were not imposed for 
any reason, retributive, deterrent, or otherwise. The Court held just the 
opposite in both cases. 
According to the Ingraham Court, “the [Eighth] Amendment suggests 
an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law 
function of government. An examination of the history of the Amendment 
and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel 
and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those 
convicted of crimes.”72 In other words, it matters who imposes the 
disability. We do not have to agree with the Court about the outcome of 
Ingraham to recognize that Warren’s definition missed a necessary 
condition. It does matter who imposes a disability, and that Warren misses 
this obvious fact suggests that the Trop Court, despite appearances to the 
contrary, did not provide a satisfying answer to the punishment question. 
Furthermore, by merely mentioning that punishment, for Eighth 
Amendment purposes, necessarily involves those who administer the 
 
 
 67. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 68. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 69. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 657. 
 70. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98–99. 
 71. This construction is supposed to retain the ambiguity noted above. 
 72. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664. 
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criminal justice system, the Ingraham Court was not offering a full answer 
to the punishment question either. 
Let us turn to Gamble. Here, the Court held, “deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”73 In 
other words, the state can be ‘on the hook’ for injuries that it does not 
impose but that it deliberately neglects to remedy. The Gamble Court, by 
developing a new test for cruel and unusual punishment, in essence, states 
an entirely new sufficient condition for punishment: deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, writing for the majority, makes a normatively persuasive case 
that the harms prisoners might suffer due to the deliberate inattention of 
officials is of the sort that we ought to eliminate by constitutional means. 
Justice Marshall’s likening of the neglect of prisoners’ medical needs to 
torture74 brings to mind influential philosophical arguments of the time 
which called into question the commonplace thought that directly causing 
a harm is wrong, while merely allowing one to happen is blameless.75 The 
underlying thought of both Marshall and these philosophical discussions is 
that when a person is in one’s care, one incurs a duty to see that she does 
not suffer grave, preventable harms, and deliberately shirking this duty can 
be as bad as imposing the harm directly. 
Groundbreaking as this decision was, the Gamble Court still does not 
offer a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as 
punishment; thus, the punishment question remained unanswered. 
C. Modern Cases 
Let us fast-forward to current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
general standard is that punishment is cruel when it is disproportionately 
harsh, given the crime76 or the type of offender,77 or when it is an 
 
 
 73. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (citations omitted). 
 74. Id. at 103. 
 75. See James Rachels’s famous article about the doing/allowing distinction, especially his 
thought experiment about drowning one’s six-year-old cousin versus merely watching “delighted[ly]” 
as the cousin drowns. James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78, 78–
86 (1975). 
 76. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, as modified (Oct. 1, 2008), opinion modified 
on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008) (banning the death penalty for nonviolent rape of a child by 
adult); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (banning a life sentence for a bad check of $100, written 
by a recidivist); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (banning the death penalty for rape of an adult 
woman); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (banning penalty of fifteen years of the cadena 
for fraud). 
 77. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (banning mandatory life in prison 
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“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”78 Courts determine 
proportionality largely by reference to “the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”79 How courts determine 
what counts as an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain depends on 
the kind of thing at issue.80 If the claim is that a prison official used 
excessive force, then one must consider (1) whether the official acted 
“maliciously and sadistically”81 and (2) the nature of the injury inflicted. If 
the claim is that the prisoner’s conditions of confinement instance 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, then one must consider 
(1) whether the prison officials were “deliberately indifferent”82 to the 
prisoner’s plight and (2) whether the prisoner has been subjected to 
“substantial risk of serious harm.”83 If the claim is that a method of 
execution instances unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, there is yet 
another test.84 All of these tests for an Eighth Amendment violation suffer 
from the same problem with respect to the punishment question, namely 
that they do not answer it. 
Amid all of this Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the most the Court 
has done with respect to the punishment question is to develop a new 
necessary condition for punishment, as it did in Wilson v. Seiter, where the 
Court explicitly considered the punishment question and held that there is 
“an intent requirement.”85 Since it should be, by now, clear why this 
innovation leaves the punishment question unresolved, I conclude this part 
of the article by highlighting the practical problem at the heart of 
sidestepping the punishment question.  
According the Seiter Court, punishment has an intent requirement, and 
for conditions of confinement cases, the culpable state of mind must be 
deliberate indifference. Suppose that a prison official oversees a prisoner, 
and further suppose, just as a general rule, that the official is deliberately 
 
 
without the possibility of parole for those under age 18); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
(banning the death penalty for offenders under age 18); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) 
(banning the death penalty for offenders under age 16); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(banning the death penalty for “mentally retarded persons”). 
 78. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 79. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 80. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (“What is necessary to establish an ‘unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain,’ we said, varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional 
violation.”). 
 81. Id. at 9. 
 82. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737, reh’g denied, No. 14-7955, 2015 WL 5052442 
(U.S. Aug. 28, 2015). 
 85. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301(1991). 
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indifferent to whatever suffering should befall the prisoner. In a situation 
such as this, what should we say about prison conditions that are bad, but 
not bad enough to suggest that the prisoner has suffered serious harm, or a 
substantial risk thereof? Is this happening still punishment, according to 
the Court? This is not answered, for all we know from Seiter is that it fails 
to be cruel punishment. For the Eighth Amendment itself, further inquiry 
is not needed. Of course, there are other provisions of the Constitution for 
which further inquiry is needed. If the prisoner is not a prisoner but a 
pretrial detainee, whom the state has no right to punish,86 one needs to 
know whether those circumstances are punishment. 
This hypothetical situation, then, reminds us of our purpose in seeking 
an answer to the punishment question. As much as the preceding might 
seem like an exercise in logic, substantive questions of great practical 
import depend on our answers to the punishment question. This is even 
true in the Eighth Amendment cases, for we saw that, time and again, the 
Court did construe punishment, just partially and (largely) covertly. This 
strategy will not do, for it puts off what must be done anyway on another 
day or in another constitutional context. 
III. THE COURT DOES NOT DEFINE PUNISHMENT ELSEWHERE 
Since there is no full answer to punishment question in the Eighth 
Amendment context, we now turn to other places where courts have tried 
to define punishment. The Constitution, in several places, calls on courts 
to distinguish between criminal law and civil law. The Fifth Amendment, 
for instance, prohibits the federal government from requiring self-
incriminating testimony during a criminal trial87 or even during a custodial 
interrogation before a criminal trial.88 The Sixth Amendment sets up a 
number of protections for defendants in criminal prosecutions, including 
public trials, a right to counsel, and trial by jury.89 The Court has sought to 
distinguish criminal law from civil law by claiming that the former 
involves “punitive purposes.” Of course, such purposes need to be defined, 
and to define them is to answer the punishment question, a task the Court 
refused to do in the Eighth Amendment context. 
 
 
 86. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may 
not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”).  
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460–61(1966) (“We are satisfied that all the principles 
embodied in the privilege [against self-incrimination] apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-
enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.”).  
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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This part begins by looking at a leading case on the criminal-civil 
distinction, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. I argue that the majority’s 
multi-factor test is completely unworkable. Next, I consider two more 
answers to the punishment question that, more or less, come from the 
Court: Justice Stewart’s answer, offered in his dissenting opinion in 
Mendoza, and Professor Stinneford’s answer, offered as a reconstruction 
of the Court’s post-Mendoza jurisprudence. As we will see, both Stewart’s 
and Stinneford’s definitions suffer from the same defect, namely an 
overly-narrow focus on intentional impositions of harm, thereby excluding 
reckless impositions. 
A. The Mendoza Test 
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court considered 
whether legislative divestiture of citizenship in response to draft-dodging 
counted as punishment.90 More specifically, the Court considered whether 
Congress could impose the divestiture “without affording the procedural 
safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”91 Ultimately, 
the Court held that the divestiture was punishment, but this conclusion 
does not concern us. What concerns us, here, is the test the Court used to 
reach its conclusion. 
The Court used the following multi-factor test to determine whether 
something counts as punishment. 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether 
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies 
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all 
relevant to the inquiry.92 
For ease of presentation, it may help to list each of the seven factors 
separately and to number them. 
(1) Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
 
 
 90. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 91. Id. at 166. 
 92. Id. at 168–69. 
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restraint 
(2) Whether the sanction has historically been regarded as a 
punishment 
(3) Whether the sanction comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter 
(4) Whether the sanction’s operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence 
(5) Whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is already a 
crime  
(6) Whether no alternative purpose to which the sanction may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it93 
(7) Whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned 
Now, obviously, these factors are independent inquiries, independent in 
the sense that the answer to one does not determine the answer to 
another.94 This independence raises the following kind of question. What 
should a court do when the answer to (1) differs from the answer to (2)? It 
seems like poor advice to require that all (1)–(7) be answered in the 
affirmative in order to deem something punishment. This is true for the 
simple reason that there can be new forms of punishment, so (2) cannot be 
required in every case. Moreover, the Court admitted that the factors could 
“point in differing directions,”95 while it still could be proper to adjudge a 
particular sanction punishment. 
An obvious alternative is to claim that something is punishment so long 
as it satisfies a majority of the factors. This seems like poor advice 
because some factors, like (1), probably matter much more than the others. 
Consider the following example to see why this might be so. Suppose a 
conservative state passes a law with the following effect. All medical 
doctors will have “MEDICAL DOCTOR” written on their state-issued 
identification cards; however, if a medical doctor is known to have 
performed an abortion within the past five years, this person will have 
“MEDICAL DOCTOR & BABYKILLER” written on the state-issued 
identification card. 
 
 
 93. I modified this factor so that an affirmative response weighs in favor of considering the 
sanction punishment. 
 94. They are not all independent. (6) is not independent of (7). 
 95. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. 
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In this example, one could very plausibly argue that, while (1), (2), and 
(5) are not satisfied, the other four factors are satisfied. Still, this labeling 
does not seem to count as punishment, however nefarious such labeling 
might be. Maybe there is a First Amendment violation.96 But it seems hard 
to sustain that this is a due process violation of the kind considered in 
Mendoza. 
If the foregoing is correct, we should conclude, minimally, that there is 
no obvious way to employ the Mendoza test. Some commentators have 
urged a stronger conclusion. Professors Rosen-Zvi and Fisher claim,  
[T]he Mendoza-Martinez test is unable to yield a principled and 
predictable answer. In every case of its application, the judge ends 
up with a mixture of yes and no answers to each of the seven factors 
and must ultimately determine whether the sanction at hand is civil 
or criminal based upon her own valuation of each factor and its 
relative weight. Inevitably, the Court resorts to tautological 
reasoning: it purports to define as criminal, and thus order 
heightened procedural safeguards for[,] sanctions that serve 
primarily to punish, when, as a matter of fact, the punitive purpose 
ascribed to the sanction rests upon some intuition regarding the 
procedural safeguards that the sanction merits.97 
In other words, according to Rosen-Zvi and Fisher, the Mendoza test 
determines nothing; instead, one’s background intuitions do all the work. 
On either view, mine or the one offered by Rosen-Zvi and Fisher, we 
need to look beyond the majority opinion in Mendoza for an answer to the 
punishment question. 
B. Post-Mendoza 
In his article, “Punishment Without Culpability,” Professor John F. 
Stinneford offers a new answer to the punishment question, drawing on 
the jurisprudence following Mendoza. Stinneford claims, “it is becoming 
increasingly clear that neither a purpose to deter, incapacitate, nor to 
rehabilitate can transform a putatively civil statute into a criminal one. 
Only a retributive purpose can.”98 In other words, according to Stinneford, 
 
 
 96. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that a state may not require citizens to 
display a message with which they disagree on state-issued license plates.). 
 97. Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 
126 (2008). 
 98. John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 
679 (2012) (citations omitted). 
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a punitive purpose is a retributive one. This suggests the following 
definition of punishment: punishment is that which is done by state actors 
with a retributive purpose. Stinneford both endorses this as a good 
definition of punishment and as a good interpretation of post-Mendoza 
decisions. For the purposes of the present effort, we will ignore the 
interpretative claim and also ignore the reasons that undergird the 
interpretative claim.99 
Stinneford does not offer a good definition of punishment because he 
cannot recognize as punishment harms that the Supreme Court, in its 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, has rightly recognized. Of particular 
note are harms that befall convicted persons as a result of state officials’ 
deliberate indifference. The Court has held, for instance, that when prison 
officials ignore a transsexual prisoner’s claim that she is danger of being 
beaten and raped by a fellow inmate, the consequent rape and battery 
count as punishment, and cruel punishment to boot.100 
Perhaps, one might retort, Stinneford’s definition can accommodate 
inmate-on-inmate prison rape, and like cases, by claiming that the 
officials’ indifference was sparked by a retributive purpose. The major 
problem with this strategy is that it would only work in some cases. 
Sometimes, an official will be indifferent to the risk of serious harm to a 
prisoner because the official thinks that the impending harm is deserved. 
Other times, officials may be indifferent because properly responding to 
risk is burdensome. If Stinneford would see punishment in the first case 
but no punishment in the second, we have two problems. First, we get 
unfair outcomes because all prisoner-plaintiffs that suffer serious harm, 
resulting from officials turning a blind eye, should be able to bring a 
constitutional tort. Second, under Stinneford’s definition, we set up a 
perverse loophole. Anytime a prisoner-plaintiff brings suit, alleging that 
serious harm befell her because of an official’s deliberate indifference, the 
official can just say that he was indifferent because he did not feel like 
working that day or some other excuse that does not entail retributive 
purpose. 
If one is tempted, at this point, to suggest that the two aforementioned 
problems are not problems with the definition, just unfortunate 
consequences of adopting the definition, it may help to recall the nature of 
our inquiry. The point was to craft a definition of punishment that is 
responsive to the practical, that is moral and political, concerns which give 
 
 
 99. Among the cases Stinneford reviews are the various sex offender cases from the 1990s where 
federal courts have held that registration and even incapacitation are not punishment. 
 100. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
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rise to several constitutional provisions, such as the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Amendments. The Supreme Court has already succeeded in 
making a persuasive case that all those who suffer serious injuries 
resulting from prison officials’ deliberate indifference should have a 
remedy in the form of a constitutional tort. If we accept that, we are 
thereby practically committed to avoiding the type of loophole, enabled by 
Stinneford’s definition of punishment. 
C. Returning to Mendoza: Stewart’s Dissent 
Justice Stewart, dissenting in Mendoza, offered another definition of 
punishment. Stewart wrote, “whether or not a statute is punitive ultimately 
depends upon whether the disability it imposes is for the purpose of 
vengeance or deterrence, or whether the disability is but an incident to 
some broader regulatory objective.”101 Largely, Stewart’s definition 
echoes that of the post-Mendoza jurisprudence, or at least Stinneford’s 
reconstruction of it. Stewart departs from Stinneford in mentioning 
deterrent purposes in addition to retributive ones.102 
Insofar as Stewart and Stinneford agree, the disagreement with Stewart 
is the same as the one with Stinneford. One must be able to recognize 
serious harms flowing from state actors’ deliberate indifference as 
punishment, and these definitions seem ill-suited to that purpose. Where 
Stewart differs from Stinneford, there is a different problem. On Stewart’s 
account, so long as an event has a deterrent purpose, it counts as 
punishment. This seems problematic because it does not allow us to 
differentiate between criminal law and tort law, as many hold that tort law 
is about deterring future bad action as well as remedying past bad 
action.103 The point is not that only criminal law punishes, for that is false; 
sometimes, courts award punitive damages in tort suits. Rather, the point 
is that treating something as punishment as soon as it has a deterrent 
 
 
 101. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 208 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 102. As a small philosophical aside, it might be thought that Stewart’s definition suffers from an 
additional defect, namely that it appears to invoke the legislature’s intentions, and there has been much 
criticism of the idea that one can attribute intentional attitudes, like beliefs, desires, fears, and 
intentions, to groups. Frankly, I think such attributions are entirely licit, at least sometimes. For 
instance, it makes sense to say, “The ACLU plans to file an amicus brief” or that “Miami Heat feared 
that the San Antonio Spurs would sweep them in the Finals.” Philosophers have given different 
answers about why such statements can turn out to be true, but most agree that the skeptical, Scalia-
type view looks pretty unintuitive. I thought it important to defend Stewart on this score, as my view 
of punishment may require such attributions. See infra Part V.A. 
 103. Jones v. Reagan, 696 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]ort law, including the law of 
constitutional torts, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory function.”). 
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purpose would render most acts taken against tortfeasors punishment, and 
if that were true, it would be harder to distinguish tort law from criminal 
law. Right now, we can say criminal law generally involves punishment, 
while tort law generally does not; whereas, under Stewart’s formulation, 
that would no longer be true. And this problem is not just an academic 
one; it is a practical problem. Without a way to distinguish tort law from 
criminal law, we have no way to comply with the Constitution’s mandates 
to give special protection to defendants in criminal cases. 
IV. LOOKING OUTSIDE THE COURTS 
Having rejected various answers to the punishment question offered by 
the courts or by those purporting to summarize the courts, we now turn to 
voices wholly outside the courts. In her article “Deliberate Indifference: 
An ‘Unnecessary’ Change?” Diana Davis offers a new definition of 
punishment.104 Her approach is specifically developed for the Eighth 
Amendment context, but we will consider it as a general answer to the 
punishment question. In this part, I first provide the best reading of 
Davis’s view, and then, I raise four criticisms. 
A. Finding the Davis Definition 
To determine whether something is punishment, the Supreme Court has 
required inquiry into the minds of state actors allegedly responsible for 
harm. Professor Davis has suggested that we drop the ‘subjective’ inquiry. 
Whether something counts as punishment, for Davis, is a purely 
‘objective’ matter, a matter that does not require any evidence of bad 
thoughts on the part of the state actor (malice, indifference, etc.). Davis 
crafts her new understanding of punishment to comport with the way 
convicts likely see the fact of suffering harm. According to Davis, convicts 
“could view everything that happens from the moment of their sentencing 
as punishment.”105 
Davis refines her definition, leaving the reader with the following. 
“[P]unishment . . . includes within it all the events transpiring upon 
imprisonment (excluding events involving third parties not living or 
working within the prison).”106 It is unfortunate that Davis shifts from 
 
 
 104. Diana L. Davis, Deliberate Indifference: An “Unnecessary” Change?, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 
923, 924 (1992). 
 105. Id. at 957. 
 106. Id. at 957–58. 
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talking about what happens from the moment of sentencing to what 
happens from the moment of imprisonment. The problems with the shift 
are obvious (1) one can be sentenced to things other than imprisonment 
and (2) one can suffer rather grave harms at the hands of state officials 
between the moment of sentencing and the moment of imprisonment. 
These criticisms are, in a certain way, cheap shots. Davis’s definition may 
not be intended as exhaustive; she says that “punishment . . . includes 
within it” all the events from imprisonment onward, not that punishment is 
only those events from imprisonment onward. All the same, given the 
criticisms raised above, it seems most reasonable to see Davis’s core claim 
to be about all that goes on post-sentencing, minus her two caveats. 
For our purposes, the Davis view is the following. Punishment is, at 
least, all those events transpiring upon sentencing, excluding events 
involving third parties not living or working within the prison. This is an 
initially plausible view, but we must determine if it can withstand scrutiny. 
B. Pre-conviction Punishment? 
The first problem with Davis’s new approach is that it does not 
acknowledge pre-conviction punishment. Suppose that a corrections 
officer beats up a man, suspected of child molestation, while the suspect is 
awaiting trial, and further suppose that officer beats the man because he 
believes the suspect is guilty. This seems no less like punishment than if 
the officer behaved the same way one month later after the suspect is 
convicted and sentenced. 
It may help here to clear up a potential logical problem. One might 
think that because the State has absolutely no right to punish anyone until 
they are convicted, pre-conviction beatings, horrible as they might be, 
cannot count as punishment. This is mistaken reasoning because those acts 
for which it makes sense to say, “The State can’t do THAT,” have to be 
things that are logically possible in the first place. If there is no such thing 
as punishing someone before they are convicted, it is literally meaningless 
to say, “The State has absolutely no right to punish anyone until they are 
convicted.” If that statement is meaningful and imposes an actual 
restriction on the State’s power, it has to be possible to inflict punishment 
before conviction. 
Courts, too, have recognized that there may be pre-conviction 
punishment and have said that this would violate Due Process.107 For 
 
 
 107. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may 
not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”). 
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instance, the Seventh Circuit has held that sexual molestation of a pretrial 
detainee by a county jail guard can constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment; a fortiori, this behavior constitutes punishment.108 Lest one 
think that only the Seventh Circuit recognizes the possibility of pretrial 
punishment, so have other circuit courts.109 In one particularly distressing 
case, the Eleventh Circuit held that denying medical care to a pregnant 
pretrial detainee, which resulted in infection and miscarriage, constituted 
punishment and therefore violated Due Process.110 
Now, a formalistic response to this critique is to note, again, that Davis 
is not offering an exhaustive definition of punishment. Her definition just 
describes a set of happenings that is sufficient for punishment; she is not 
telling us what is necessary for punishment. All the same, in purposely 
drawing the line at the moment of sentencing, Davis implicitly suggests 
that there is something special about that time, as opposed to those times 
prior. This suggestion, given my counterexample and the plausible 
holdings of courts, is problematic. Anytime state officials act with 
retributive purpose, malice, or deliberate indifference, we very well might 
have a case of punishment, and that is true before or after conviction. 
C. Going Above and Beyond 
The previous criticism tried to show that Davis’s notion of punishment 
is too narrow; this criticism and the next try to show that Davis’s 
definition is also too broad. 
On Davis’s approach, the following situation would count as 
punishment. Despite being housed in a clean, well-heated prison, being 
given high-quality, heavy clothes along with terrifically warm and 
comfortable bedding, and being subject to weekly health check-ups, a 
prisoner contracts pneumonia. The health service in the prison 
immediately diagnoses the prisoner and begins aggressively treating her. 
Nevertheless, the prisoner succumbs to the disease and dies. Here we have 
a harm that occurred after sentencing, yet it seems confused to say that the 
prisoner’s death was part of the punishment. 
Davis recognizes this potential danger. Because she is writing about the 
Eighth Amendment context, Davis can claim that the abovementioned 
 
 
 108. Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he right of pretrial 
detainees to be free from excessive force amounting to punishment is protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 110. Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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sorts of situations are not cruel punishments. They are not cruel because 
they do not “offend common standards of decency.”111 Something 
problematic still lingers in the way Davis classifies this kind of event, but 
we can see this most clearly only after my third counterexample to her 
account. 
D. What if the Harm Would Have Happened Anyway? 
On Davis’s approach, the following situation would count as 
punishment. A man from a town, call it Pompeii, is arrested for simple 
assault. The man, who has lived in Pompeii every day of his life and 
intends to stay there, agrees to a plea bargain. To his delight, he gets to 
remain in Pompeii, for he is sentenced to sixty days in the local jail. The 
next day, however, a nearby volcano suddenly erupts, killing everyone in 
Pompeii, including all occupants of the jail. This situation would count as 
punishment for Davis because the prisoner’s death is a harm that occurred 
after he was sentenced and is not attributable to any third party who works 
or lives outside the prison. 
One might be wondering why I posed this counterexample. This 
situation described is obviously outlandish. Volcanoes have destroyed 
entire towns,112 but such occurrences are awfully uncommon; thus, it 
might be thought too demanding to request that Davis modify her 
definition of punishment to handle these unusual cases. Moreover, one 
might think that Davis can handle this counterexample, bizarre as it is, by 
employing the same argumentative strategy we saw in the previous part. 
She can say that though this is punishment, it is not cruel punishment. 
Therefore, so the argument might go, she avoids any counterintuitive 
results. 
We can begin exposing the problem with that response by noting 
something about Davis’s definition of punishment. She explicitly excludes 
harms inflicted on prisoners by third parties that neither live nor work in 
the prison. If the only thing driving Davis in developing her definition 
were the thought that prisoners can see everything that happens to them 
after a conviction as punishment, there would be no reason for this carve-
out. One could proceed without it, and the way to deal with the possibility 
that prisoners receive damages for harms inflicted by such third parties is 
 
 
 111. Davis, supra note 104, at 958. 
 112. See generally RALEIGH TREVELYAN, THE SHADOW OF VESUVIUS: POMPEII AD 79 (1976) 
(discussing the destruction of the Roman city of Pompeii and other cities destroyed in the Vesuvius 
eruption of 79 CE.). 
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to develop a test for ‘cruel punishment’ that eliminates this possibility. 
Davis, however, does not do that in the case of third parties who neither 
live nor work in the prison. She thinks this should be ruled out ex ante as 
not even rising to the level of punishment at all. This leads one to wonder: 
if this is the right strategy for the third parties why is this not the right 
strategy for volcanoes and pneumonia. 
Behind her caveat for third parties probably lies the thought that state 
officials have to be, in some important sense, responsible for the harm 
inflicted on the convicted person. If the officials are not responsible for the 
harm, the question of whether the harm was severe, cruel, or anything else 
should not arise and should not reach the courts, so the thought goes. 
Davis errs, however, in thinking that the behavior of third parties is the 
only way state officials may lack responsibility for harm befalling a 
convict. State officials are also not responsible when they do everything 
within their power to prevent harm, as in the pneumonia case. State 
officials are also not responsible when none of their actions is a but-for 
cause of the harm, as in the volcano case.113 
Although the volcano is outlandish, the principle it supports is intuitive 
and present in many areas of law. In criminal law, tort law, even contract 
and property law, if one party cannot show that the defendant was a but-
for cause of the alleged harm, the case falls apart, with very, very few 
exceptions.114 
E. A Final Nail in the Coffin: The Angry Mob 
This last counterexample to Davis indicates another reason why her 
definition is too narrow. On Davis’s approach, the following situation 
would not count as punishment. An infamous criminal is transported to a 
new prison. Local vigilantes get word of this and decide to pay a visit. The 
prisoners are all in the prison’s recreational yard when the vigilantes 
arrive. The vigilantes, none of whom work for the prison, find the prisoner 
and beat him to death while prison guards stand around idly, polishing 
their guns and whistling. 
This would not count as punishment for Davis because, though this is 
 
 
 113. Just to be clear, I am not equating “A is responsible for x” with “A is a but-for cause of x.” I 
am aware that one can be a but-for cause of x while not being responsible for x. I am claiming that one 
cannot usually be responsible for x while not being a but-for cause of x. Of course, there is even a 
well-known reason why one can be responsible for x while not being a but-for cause of x: over-
determined events. 
 114. These exceptions often include over-determined events. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2011). 
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post-sentencing harm, it involves third parties who neither live nor work in 
the prison. Now, perhaps, Davis can find some way to evade this 
counterexample, but any method that would look minimally plausible 
would underscore my key point that what matters most for answering the 
punishment question is determining whether state officials are responsible 
for the harm. 
V. A NEW DEFINITION OF PUNISHMENT 
The numerous problems with the previous accounts suggest a new 
definition of punishment. Punishment is (a) any sufficiently serious harm 
imposed by someone acting under color of law with a retributive purpose 
or (b) any sufficiently serious harm that befalls a punished or incarcerated 
person if that harm is intentionally inflicted by those acting under color of 
law or if the harm would have been prevented, had state officials exercised 
an ordinary standard of care. This definition has a number of parts, so 
before defending it against objections, I would do well to defend it against 
misinterpretations. 
A. Some Clarifications 
The beginning, or (a) part, of the definition is basically Stinneford’s 
definition. It is filled out with “someone acting under the color of law” for 
obvious reasons. If the actual officials hire other people to do their dirty 
work, that is still punishment. Certainly, if it would be cruel and unusual 
punishment for corrections officers to kill prisoners in their sleep, the 
constitutional violation would not be evaded if the officers hired assassins. 
I used Stinneford’s definition, which requires retributive purpose instead 
of Justice Stewart’s more capacious “retributive or deterrent purpose,” 
because some civil law, particularly tort law, has a deterrent purpose. 
Products liability law is often justified by its ability to deter those involved 
in the creation and distribution of goods from taking actions that result in 
harm to consumers. Making Buick pay for the injuries caused by its 
defective wheel, for instance, is not to punish the company, even though 
the court is acting under color of law and, by forcing the payment, imposes 
harm.115  
The big departure from Stinneford, at least in the (a) part of definition, 
concerns the “sufficiently serious” part. To justify this modification, one 
need only reflect on how far-reaching the definition would be without this 
 
 
 115. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 395 (1916). 
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qualification. Under the Stinneford definition of punishment, it looks like 
school children are subject to punishment anytime school officials level 
harms with retributive intent. An upshot of this would be that every 
detention or lost recess time meted out to students looks like an infliction 
of punishment without due process of law. To avoid this normatively 
absurd result, Stinneford’s definition needs to be qualified in some way. 
An obvious way is to take a route inspired by the Ingraham Court: just as 
Ingraham shielded every sanction a school official might levy upon a 
student from Eighth Amendment scrutiny, one might shield schools from 
certain kinds of Fifth Amendment inquiry. This route seems problematic 
because the government should have no safe haven wherein all manner of 
harm can be freely visited upon individuals. The practical solution is to 
require that the harm inflicted with retributive intent be of sufficient 
seriousness to amount to punishment.116 This solution can assuage worries 
that our definition will require a trial before a teacher can make a student 
stand in the corner; at the same, this solution offers grounds on which to 
overturn Ingraham. 
The second or (b) part of the definition is where serious confusion 
might emerge. The (b) part deals with harms that occur downstream from 
incarceration or a situation that would count as punishment under the 
(a) part. The (b) part refers to things like the conditions of confinement 
and harms inflicted by third parties like inmate-to-inmate prison rape. The 
set of harms which count as punishment under the (b) part is obviously 
much larger than the set included under the (a) part. In the (a) set, we only 
count harms intentionally caused by a state actor’s retributive purpose; 
meanwhile, in the (b) set, we count harms that are unintentionally caused 
as well as those intentionally caused. Consider the following hypothetical 
situation for an intuitive argument as to why this should be so. If a 
corrections officer, on the way to the prison, recklessly rear-ends me, 
while I am driving to the same prison to visit a friend, she does not punish 
me. Arguably, however, if I am a convict and the reckless corrections 
officer totals the car while transporting me to another prison, I am 
punished. One can say in this latter case, but not in the former, that by dint 
of a criminal conviction, this harm befell the convict. And that is 
shorthand for saying: by dint of some state actor seeking retribution 
against the convict, this harm befell him. Of course, there are objections 
 
 
 116. It might be wondered what counts as “sufficiently serious.” One might wonder whether I 
intend to exclude certain kinds of court-ordered shaming practices, especially in light of my 
BABYKILLER example, infra Part III.A. The unsatisfying answer has to be “Well, it depends on the 
case.” 
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one might raise here, and I address those below, but an objector can grant 
the following. While there may be a weak case for calling the totaling 
situation “punishment,” there is no case for calling the rear-ending 
situation “punishment.” If that is so, we share the practical intuition that a 
broader range of harms might count as punishment if one is already 
punished. 
There is something else about the second half of my definition that 
might be unclear. I suggest that the harms could be intentionally inflicted 
or the result of an official not exercising an ordinary standard of care. It 
might be thought that this is redundant. In this vein, one might think, “If 
something counts as punishment as soon as the official acts negligently, it 
surely counts as punishment if the official acts recklessly or intentionally. 
So the rule should just talk about harms inflicted that violate the ordinary 
standard of care.” This is mistaken because one can punish by doing things 
that are not contrary to the ordinary standard of care. In fact, exercising 
ordinary care may require punishment. If one prisoner is relentlessly 
beating another prisoner, it may be negligent not to strike the attacking 
prisoner with a billy club. 
B. Negligent Infliction of Serious Harm: Is it Really Punishment? 
A bigger point of contention about my account is that it allows harm 
caused by state officials’ negligence to count as punishment. It might be 
objected that such harms can hardly constitute punishment.117 
They should constitute punishment for the kind of reason advanced by 
Davis. If we think from the perspective of the prisoner or detainee, any 
harm that accrues to her, for which the state is somehow responsible, 
seems like punishment. This might take the form of something obvious 
and intentionally inflicted, like a prison sentence, or something less 
intentional like forgetting to heat a prison or running a prison in such a 
way that facilitates prison rape. The reason for taking the perspective of 
the person potentially subject to punishment is obvious. We developed our 
constitutional protections with this person in mind. It matters far less 
whether some other person takes the treatment to be punishment. 
If the retort here is that every minor, unintentional, harm would then 
count as punishment, I would remind the reader that the definition is 
qualified with “of sufficient seriousness” to handle worries about minor 
harms. 
 
 
 117. See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1968) (asserting that 
punishment “must be intentionally administered,” not accidental). 
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C. What about Incapacitation? 
One might charge that my definition of punishment is under-inclusive 
because it does not cover significant harms, like lifelong confinement, if 
the state has an incapacitative, as opposed to retributive, purpose. 
Focusing on a particular case may serve to sharpen this objection. 
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court upheld a Kansas law, which allowed 
the state to confine someone “likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual 
violence”118 for an “indefinite duration.”119 Particularly distressing is the 
fact that the evidentiary burden the state must bear in order to, essentially, 
incarcerate someone, is the preponderance of the evidence standard, not 
the higher beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for inflicting 
punishment. The Court upheld this because it agreed with Kansas that the 
civil commitment was not punishment. On the objection under 
consideration, my definition errs by agreeing with the Hendricks Court 
and not seeing this great infliction of harm as punishment. 
I do agree with the Hendricks majority, abstractly, that incapacitating a 
person because she is both mentally ill and dangerous to others is not 
punishment. At least in the abstract, even if the government decided 
tomorrow that it would indefinitely incapacitate everyone who was likely 
to commit a crime, relying on either genetic information or actuarial data, 
this would still not constitute punishment. It might, however, raise equal 
protection concerns or substantive due process concerns, but not 
punishment concerns. This stance on a hypothetical situation, though, 
somewhat depends on the situation remaining hypothetical. It is unlikely 
that a real mass incapacitation would fail to feature retribution. This same 
sense of doubt is how one should meet the actual situation of Hendricks, 
too. We should be much more skeptical than the majority was that there 
was no retributive purpose behind the restrictions placed on Leroy 
Hendricks and others like him. I would have inferred a retributive purpose 
from a combination of factors largely unexplored by the majority. These 
include society’s hatred for pedophiles—the primary target of the Kansas 
law—the fact that the state acknowledged that there is treatment for 
pedophilia but declined giving it to Hendricks either during his prison 
sentence or his civil commitment, and the fact that the state did not 
consider less restrictive means of protecting the public.120 Given these 
 
 
 118. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01. 
 119. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997). 
 120. Justice Breyer discusses these latter two factors in his dissent. Id. at 373–97 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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factors, it is at least arguable that Kansas was actually seeking retribution 
against Hendricks and not merely trying to protect the public against a 
sexual predator. As such, the confinement imposed by Kansas and many 
other states with sexually violent predator laws was punishment. 
D. What about Rehabilitation? 
The final objection to consider is whether my definition of punishment 
illicitly smuggles in a justification for punishment. If such were true it 
would present both theoretical and practical difficulties. Let us develop 
this objection and see how far it goes. 
For something to count as punishment on my account, it typically 
involves a retributive purpose either directly or as a downstream effect of 
retribution. Saying this appears to imply that my account not only defines 
punishment but also justifies punishment on retributivist grounds. This 
looks problematic in part because it is theoretically illicit to define a 
phenomenon in such way as to foreclose debate about the justification for 
having the phenomenon. This is especially so in the case of punishment 
since there is a lively debate over the justification for punishment, and 
rehabilitation has long been an important contender.121 Another, more 
practical reason to worry about restricting punishment to those harms 
connected with retribution as opposed to rehabilitation is the following. 
Suppose a state inflicts a very grave harm on a convict but does so on the 
theory that this will rehabilitate him. We can imagine some A Clockwork 
Orange type of scenario in which the rehabilitation looks as bad as the 
disease.122 
My response to both worries begins by just clarifying retributive 
purpose. I mean something less theoretically ambitious than those who are 
“retributivists about punishment,” where this means that people who 
justify punishment by citing just deserts or even vengeance. On my view, a 
person A undertakes action x with retributive purpose, when A does x with 
the thought that doing x gets back at some other party B for some wrong 
for which B is responsible. It is a further question to decide what justifies 
getting back at B. Maybe A wants to get back at B because that is B’s just 
desert; maybe A wants to get back at B because that will deter B from 
doing whatever he did again; maybe A wants to get back at B in order to 
 
 
 121. An early advocate of the rehabilitation justification was Plato. See PLATO, Gorgias, in 
PLATO: COLLECTED DIALOGUES (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., W. D. Woodhead trans.) 
(c. 400 B.C.E.). 
 122. See generally ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962). 
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make B a better person; maybe A wants to get back at B because that will 
deter others from acting like B henceforth. 
The general structure of my view is that retribution in the pared down 
sense is the purpose that largely defines punishment, but once we have 
defined the phenomenon, we are free to attempt to justify it with separate 
reasons. This picture of understanding a voluntary action, like punishing 
someone, is pretty commonplace. On a standard picture of what it means 
for an action to be intentional or voluntary,123 the actor has to be able to 
provide a minimal purpose that explains why she is moving her body as 
she is.124 Only after one discerns this minimal purpose and has thereby 
seen the behavior as a voluntary action can one turn to wondering what, if 
anything, justifies committing that particular voluntary action. An example 
may help to clarify this. Suppose, for instance, that a man, named Carlos, 
is swinging a heavy blunt object and making contact with another person’s 
leg. If Carlos acts voluntarily, he is answerable to a simple why-question. 
That is, someone may licitly ask why Carlos is swinging the object. Carlos 
can, in turn, say things like “I am trying to hit that person,” or “I am trying 
to hit the piñata.” If, for instance, Carlos says that he is trying to hit the 
person, that is not yet a justification for acting this way; it merely makes 
the action intelligible as a voluntary action at all. A justification would be 
something like mentioning that this other person hit Carlos first or that this 
person took Carlos’s piñata. 
To return to the worry that generated this digression, on my definition 
of punishment, rehabilitationalists about punishment are committed to 
harming people with retributive purpose. Of course, this sounds weird not 
only because rehabilitation is not supposed to be harmful but also because 
rehabilitation is thought to be opposed to retribution. This weirdness 
should dissipate once we note two things. First, something can harm a 
person, even if it yields a net benefit. Amputating Hippolyte’s foot harms 
him, even if he would die without the operation.125 Locking someone in a 
jail cell harms them, even if (by some miracle) it makes them a better 
person. Second, if we understand retributive purpose in the pared down 
sense of supplying the minimal reason which makes some behavior 
intelligible as voluntary, we will not see retributive purpose and 
rehabilitation as diametrically opposed. 
 
 
 123. I shall use the word voluntary, though in philosophical jargon it is more commonplace to say 
intentional. I am hoping to avoid confusion with legal jargon, where intentional means something 
more than merely voluntary. 
 124. See generally G. E. M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957). 
 125. GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, MADAME BOVARY 251 (2001). 
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Given my view about retributive purpose, the A Clockwork Orange 
issue is unlikely to arise. I can say that those state actors acted with 
retributive purpose and did thus punish the protagonist Alex, even if the 
justification for acting with retributive purpose was rehabilitative.  
Finally, to revisit Hendricks, the Kansas statute may not be punishing 
anyone. This is not because the state claims it acts with incapacitative 
purpose. Rather, Kansas may not be punishing anyone because the state 
may not be trying to get back at anyone for anything. The Kansas statute 
allows state officials to incapacitate persons indefinitely even before any 
wrongdoing is deemed to have been done.126 The dangerousness of the 
person, not a wrong committed by that person, is that to which the 
treatment is to serve as a response. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this course of this Article, I have argued that one finds no workable 
definition of punishment in the courts. There is no definition in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, even though the word “punishment” actually 
shows up in the text of the Constitution. There is no workable definition in 
the Court’s criminal-civil distinction jurisprudence either. I have also 
argued that this lack is problematic because courts, without an explicit, 
workable definition, must rely on partial definitions gleaned from here and 
there. Without being explicitly formulated, these partial definitions cannot 
even be rationally appraised and may have unjust results. Turning away 
from the courts, I looked at a definition of punishment offered by a 
commentator, Diana Davis, who had the insightful idea to think about 
punishment from the perspective of those suffering adverse treatment from 
the state. This perspective, I argued, is the correct lens, for our practical 
intuitions about punishment are, deeply enough, worries about the fate of 
this person. After interrogating the Davis definition, I found several 
problems, problems that I attempted to remedy in formulating my new 
definition of punishment. According to my definition, a happening counts 
as punishment when and only when (a) someone acting under color of law 
imposed a sufficiently serious harm upon another with a retributive 
purpose or (b) any sufficiently serious subsequent harm that befalls a 
punished or incarcerated person as a consequence that is intentionally 
inflicted by those acting under color law or would have been prevented, 
had state officials exercised an ordinary standard of care. 
 
 
 126. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01. 
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To conclude, I hope tackle a different type of worry about my 
endeavor, not a worry that wonders whether a better answer to the 
question might be found but one that wonders whether I have asked a 
proper question in the first place. In this essay I set out to find a general 
answer to the punishment question; that is, I have sought a single set of 
conditions that, if met, count as punishment for the Eighth Amendment 
context as well as other constitutional contexts. It might be wondered 
whether this is wise. What licenses someone to think that we should take 
punishment to refer to the same phenomenon in these different contexts? 
In other domains, the Court has held that the same lexical item may mean 
different things depending on the context, and we observe this simple truth 
in everyday life. For instance, the Court has held that interrogation means 
one thing in the Fifth Amendment context127 and another thing in the Sixth 
Amendment context.128 To cite from ‘real life,’ we know that the word 
bear refers to several different things, a large creature, the action of 
carrying or supporting something, and giving birth to offspring. Why think 
that there is an answer to the punishment question? 
To respond, I reiterate something said at the outset of this Article. It 
seems like there is a single practical concern, though expressed variously, 
to which several constitutional provisions attempt to give voice. This 
concern is about that thing we demand to be humane and not cruel, the 
same thing we ought to impose only upon prior notice, which we ought to 
impose only with strong procedural safeguards in place. This single thing 
is harm imposed by the state, inflicted to ‘get back at’ someone, or 
practically any harm that results from the state trying to ‘get back at’ 
someone—with some caveats. This getting back at people really ought not 
to be cruel, really ought not to be imposed unless people have the 
opportunity to learn which acts will occasion such treatment, and really 
ought not to be imposed without a good deal of proof, etc. 
The alternative to thinking this is to suggest that there is punishment 
for thinking about prison conditions, punishment for thinking about 
sentences meted out by judges and juries, punishment mentioned in 
statutes, and so on. If asked what these notions have in common, the 
answer would be nothing. These would all be rightly called punishment 
merely by happenstance or some connection that remains ineffable. This 
alternative to my methodology makes our various claims look disordered 
and inadequately thought-out. That is not how our practical intuitions 
 
 
 127. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
 128. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss1/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL WHAT? 41 
 
 
 
 
concerning the proper use of punishment actually work. Or at least, I 
would hope not. 
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